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Abstract 
China’s maintenance of a de facto peg against the US dollar during and following the 
Asian financial crisis caused a realignment of exchange rates in the Asian region.  This 
paper explores the “equilibrium” level of China’s real effective rate in the lead-up to, 
during and following that crisis.  An adaptation of the Devarajan-Lewis-Robinson three-
good general equilibrium model is employed to estimate time paths of the equilibrium 
real effective exchange rate under a variety of assumptions about the balance of trade.  
Key requirements of the model are indices of import and export prices in time series.  
Since these are unavailable from secondary sources they are here constructed from trade 
data.  The results suggest that, while there is no clear evidence of undervaluation as of 
2004, China’s real effective exchange rate was on the low side in the lead-up to and 
during the crisis, due in part to an extraordinary rate of accumulation of foreign reserves 
and an associated trade surplus following the integration of its hitherto multiple exchange 
rates in 1994.  If, instead, China had run a more typical trade deficit, say amounting to 10 
per cent of export revenue or 1.5 per cent of GDP, it is estimated that China’s real 
effective exchange rate would have been higher by about a tenth prior to the crisis. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Chinese government’s de facto peg to the appreciating dollar in the latter half 
of the 1990s is said to have stabilised financial flows in the region during the Asian 
financial crisis.
1  Yet the peg may have been associated with substantial undervaluation 
of the RMB prior to and during the crisis, substantial revaluations against Asian 
competitors notwithstanding.
2  Although the suitability of the de facto peg was widely 
questioned, leading to the modest relaxation of 2005,
3 the associated fluctuations in 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Dornbusch (1999), Chen (1999) and Ni (1999).  Prior to 2000, when the RMB might 
have depreciated under a more flexible regime, one substantial proponent of the dollar peg was the US 
government, which feared that a devaluation of the RMB would worsen the bilateral trade imbalance with 
China and raise protectionist pressures in the build-up to the 2000 election.  Insiders suggest that one 
reward for the maintenance of the peg was US agreement on China’s accession to the WTO.  Yet, after 
2001, there was a clamour in the US Congress for flexibility upward (as reflected in speeches by Bunning 
R-KY; Green R-Wis and Senator Schumer D-NY).  See also Frankel (2004). 
2 For evidence on real exchange rates during the crisis, see Fernald and Babson (2000), Tyers and Yang 
(2000) and Yang and Tyers (2001). 
3 For criticism of the peg, see Zhang and Shen (2000) and Yang and Tyers (2001).  Even the IMF 
advocated a move toward greater flexibility, as suggested in the Australian Financial Review (AFR), 27 
June 2000.  Comments by the governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), Dai Xianglong, suggested as 
early as 2000 that a more flexible policy was under consideration (AFR, 20 July 2000).  On 21 July 2005 
the People’s Bank of China, with the authorisation of the State Council, announced the change of regime.  
Henceforth, the RMB would follow a “managed float” based on a basket of currencies the content of 
which, and the associated weights, have not been revealed. 
  2China’s real effective exchange rate highlight the need to identify an “equilibrium” real 
effective rate and a mix of macroeconomic policies that might bring it about. 
Earlier papers to address the Chinese real exchange rate include that by Chou and 
Shih (1998).  They investigate movements of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rate, concluding that the RMB was overvalued through the 1980s and 
undervalued in the early 1990s.  Ma (2000) constructs a time series for the real exchange 
rate by deflating changes in the nominal rate.  This is then regressed against government 
expenditure, domestic bank loans, the terms of trade, net exports and the domestic 
interest rate premium and the fitted values extracted as the “equilibrium” real exchange 
rate.  By this means he finds that the RMB was overvalued after 1995.  Finally, Hussain 
and Radelet (2000) use an index based on the ratio of the wholesale prices of China’s 
trading partners with China’s consumer price index.  They find that China experienced a 
trend real appreciation after 1990, one that accelerated through the Asian crisis. 
In this paper, rather than comparing prices across countries directly, we focus on 
their relative changes through time.  Our criterion for “equilibrium” is not the 
coincidence of the law of one price but instead a “sustainable” range of net inflows on the 
capital account, defined broadly to include changes in official foreign reserves.  We 
estimate China’s real effective exchange rate from recorded data for the period 1987 
through 2004 and then use a simple general equilibrium model to conduct counterfactual 
experiments.  The model is a derivative of that used previously by Devarajan, Lewis and 
Robinson.
4  It includes only three goods and therefore requires only two key behavioural 
parameters: an elasticity of substitution in consumption and an elasticity of 
transformation in production.  With it, we can not only address the trend of China’s real 
exchange rate but also ask how it might have differed under alternative macroeconomic 
policies. 
Our results suggest the Chinese real exchange rate was depreciating after 1990 
with a reversal of this trend following the integration of its exchange rates in 1994.  In 
spite of the subsequent real appreciation, however, the model gives evidence of 
undervaluation in this period, and through the remainder of the decade, due primarily to 
                                                 
4 See Devarajan et al. (1990, 1993) and Devarajan (1999). 
  3an extraordinary accumulation of official foreign reserves.
5  This meant that China’s 
exports may have been “artificially” competitive relative to those of its Asian neighbours 
in the lead-up to, and following, the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  As imports were 
permitted to expand after 2000, however, the continuation of the extraordinary reserve 
accumulation merely sterilised expanded private capital inflows.  The results therefore 
offer no clear case for undervaluation in the latter part of the period.
6
We canvass alternative explations for the extraordinary accumulation of reserves, 
including the view that it is motivated by mercantilism (Dooley et al., 2004) and that it is 
due to a “savings glut” relative to investment opportunities (Chinn and Ito, 2005), but 
conclude that the primary influence is perceived financial immaturity, motivating the 
retention of capital controls and stable nominal parity against the US$.
7  In this 
macroeconomic environment, the stability of the domestic price level depends on the 
corresponding stability of the real exchange rate.  Since the financial crisis, at least, 
reserve accumulation has retained this stability while allowing substantial foreign direct 
investment. 
Two important difficulties arise in the application of the model, however.  First, 
the key to the equilibrium level of the real effective exchange rate is a judgement about 
the “sustainability” of the associated net private inflows on the capital account.  Other 
things equal, the larger these are relative to the rate at which foreign reserves are 
accumulated, the larger will be the equilibrium real effective exchange rate.  We address 
this by considering a range of possible trade balance settings.  Second, the model requires 
price indices for imports and exports.  These are not available from Chinese statistics and 
so we estimate them from international trade data. 
The section to follow reviews the Devarajan-Lewis-Robinson model and our 
approach to its use.  Section 3 then describes the construction of the price indices 
required while Section 4 derives estimates of the key elasticities in the model.  In Section 
5 the sustainability of capital account flows is discussed and, in Section 6, a range of 
                                                 
5 China’s premier Zhu Rongji defended the massive reserve accumulation in early 1997 as helping “to keep 
Hong Kong stable” (Wei and Zeckhauser 1998).  Since we find that this accumulation of reserves 
suppressed China’s real effective exchange rate in the lead-up to the financial crisis, however, the question 
arises as to whether this action might have had a destabilising effect on the other exporters in the region. 
6 This is in accord with recent work by Cheung et al. (2006), amongst others. 
7 China’s capital controls are trending toward greater openness, as indicated by Xiao and Kimball (2006). 
  4equilibrium real effective exchange rates are derived and compared with those observed.  
Section 7 offers conclusions. 
 
2.  The Model 
  The economy is modelled as small and open and its output includes two 
imperfectly transformable varieties, one of which, X, is exported and the other, D, is 
consumed domestically.  From the viewpoint of consumers, D is an imperfect substitute 
for imports, M.  Devarajan et al. (1990) call this characterisation of a single economy 
with two activities (D and X) and three commodities (D, X and M) the 1-2-3 model.  In it 
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where the elasticity of substitution is σ  = 1/(1+ρ) > 0.  Changes in consumption tastes 
through time may have led to alterations in αD and αX in a manner that is exogenous to the 
determination of relative prices.  This is allowed for by setting: 
(3)  ()
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In proportional change form, then, (2) reduces to: 
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  5where the βs are (exogenous) share parameters and δ < -1.  The optimising behaviour of 
firms serves to maximise nominal GDP = p
D
 D + p
X
 X, subject to this constraint.  Again, 















where the elasticity of transformation is Ω = -1/(1+δ) > 0.  Before constructing the 
proportional change form, consideration must be given to the effects of China’s 
considerable economic expansion between 1987 and 2004 on this supply relationship.  
The growth can be thought of as shifting the entire production possibility frontier 
outward.  An unbiased shift would simply expand Q and have no effect on relative prices.  
There has, however, been a recorded rise in X/D, suggesting a bias in the underlying 
factor accumulation and technical change patterns that favours exportables.
8  This 
suggests that there may have been changes to βD and βX that are exogenous to the 
determination of relative prices.  We allow for a non-linear effect of factor accumulation 
and technical change by setting: 
(7)  ()
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In proportional change form, then, (6) reduces to: 
(8)  () ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ
XD XD p p β −= Ω − + , 
where, from (7),  .  12 ˆ 2 bb β =+ t
                                                
  It remains to specify the balance of payments.  Here we abstract from tariff and 
non-tariff barriers affecting trade and emphasise the role of the capital account, broadly 
defined to include changes in official foreign reserves.  The exogenous border prices, p
X 
and p
M, are measured in US dollars and then converted to domestic currency.  No 
distortions are considered, aside from those embodied in this currency conversion.  For 
balance, the sum of net inflows on the capital account, KA, and net inflows on the current 
 
8 Of course, this may also suggest that the official statistics undervalue the non-traded components of GDP.  
Our analysis assumes the official statistics are accurate.  This is also assumed by Whalley and Xin (2006), 
who conclude that there is an extremely large gulf between labour productivity in the export-oriented 
industries that are the destinations for China’s considerable FDI compared with others.  This view receives 
  6account, CA, must be zero.  The net (private and official) inflows on the capital account 
are: 
(9)    NF KA S R =− ∆
where SNF is the net inflow of private foreign savings to finance investment and ∆R is the 
annual increment to official foreign reserves.  Those on the current account are: 
(10)   
XM CA p X p M N =−+
where N is net factor income from abroad.  If foreign labour income is ignored, this is 
approximately  ( ) ** CW F CW F F Nr K r K rK K K π =− = − − , where r* and r are the foreign 
and domestic rates of return, KCW is the total holding of assets abroad by Chinese 
households and public and private institutions, KF is the total holding of Chinese assets 
by foreigners and π is the premium on the rate of return on investments in China.  Since 
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The parameter λ is used here for consistency with the approach of Devarajan, 
Lewis and Robinson.  We spell it out in this way to make clear its dependence on net 
inflows on the capital account and the extent to which private net inflows, SNF, might be 
offset by the accumulation of foreign reserves, ∆R.
9  The parameter λ might therefore be 
thought of as approximately one plus net income and capital account inflow as a 
proportion of export earnings.  When this inflow rises relative to export earnings imports 
also rise relative to export earnings and so λ rises.  It is, however, inversely proportional 
to ∆R.  Equation (11) is then readily converted to proportional change form as
10: 
(12)  ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ
MX pM pX λ += + +  . 
                                                                                                                                                   
further support from Rodrik (2006), who notes the high quality of China’s exports, compared with the 
exports of other developing countries of similar income per capita. 
9 We are aware that China has had capital controls in place throughout the period of interest here, thus 
imposing policy constraints on SNF.  These did not prevent substantial private capital account flows, 
however, and a considerable redirection of these outside China during the Asian financial crisis, as 
indicated by Tyers and Yang (2000). 
10 This form is slightly awkward since λ comprises both components we expect to make exogenous, in 
particular SNF and ∆R, and the value of exports, which is endogenous.  We will treat it as an exogenous 
variable, however, choosing its value in relation to export earnings.  Alternative proportional change 
reductions of equation (10) are no more attractive in the case of China because the sign of the trade balance 
(and the capital account balance) changes during the period of interest. 
  7  We then have three simple equations in proportional changes, (4), (8) and (12).  
By subtracting (8) from (4) and then (12) from the result we have the following 
expression for the proportional change in the price of domestic goods in terms of the 
corresponding proportional changes the border prices and in λ: 
(13) 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
XM X M
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2 t
 , 
where, from (3) and (7),  1 ˆ 2 aa α =+  and  .  The beauty of this expression is 
that it allows the endogenous change in the domestic price level to be decomposed into 
four components, the first being due to a change in foreign prices, the second to a change 
in the terms of trade, the third to a change in net inflows on the capital account and the 
final one to changes in consumption tastes on the one hand and factor supply and 
technology bias on the other.  Given that the border prices are observable and exogenous 
to the small open economy and that changes in the domestic price level are the keys to 
real exchange rates, this expression allows us to relate capital account flows, and changes 
in official foreign reserves in particular, directly to the real exchange rate. 
1 ˆ 2 bb β =+2 t
  We define the nominal exchange rate, E, according to modern convention, as the 
number of units of foreign exchange that might be obtained in return for a unit of the 
domestic currency.  It is then natural to define the real exchange rate, e
R, correspondingly, 
as the number of baskets of foreign produced goods and services obtained were a 
corresponding basket of domestically produced goods and services to be likewise 
relinquished.  It follows that the bilateral real exchange rate with trading partner i 
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The real effective exchange rate is then a trade weighted average of these bilateral real 
exchange rates: 
(15)  () ,
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i p  are bilateral trading prices while p
X and p
D
 are indices over all the 
focus country’s exports and non-traded goods, respectively.
11
  The link between the real effective exchange rate and flows on the capital account 
is now clear.  It begins with the parameter λ, which depends positively on net inflows on 
the capital account (SNF - ∆R) via equation (11).  The price of the domestic non-traded 
good, p
D, then depends positively on λ via equation (12) and finally, the real effective 
exchange rate depends positively on p
D via equation (14).  The equilibrium real exchange 
rate can then be calculated from these equations based on either a recorded series for the 
trade balance parameter, λ, or a counterfactual one. 
 
3. Construction of the Price Indices: 
  As is clear from the previous section, the model depends critically on the 
availability of import and export price indices.  Since the Chinese authorities do not 
supply these, it has been necessary for us to construct them from UN Commodity Trade 
Statistics by averaging unit values across traded commodities.  While this approach 
shares a number of deficiencies with all index construction
12 it is the best available option 
if equilbrium real exchange rates are to be analysed at the suggested level of aggregation.  
A deficiency of particular importance is that the trade data are available only on an 
annual basis.  This constrains the quality of our subsequent estimates of the elasticities of 
substitution and transformation. 
  To make clear our method, consider the case of the export price index,  ,          




jt p , across traded 
commodities, j for each year, t.  If the base year, from which the weights are derived, is 
t=0, we seek: 
                                                 
11 A commonly used alternative measure (Hussain and Radelet, 2000) is the trade-weighted average of the 
ratio of the local consumer price to the wholesale price of each trading partner.  This measure retains prices 
of non-traded services in the numerator but not in the denominator.  For “small” open economies, this 
measure and the ratio of GDP deflators used in this paper follow very similar paths through time. 
12 The same deficiencies are common amongst averages of prices across disparate commodities in time 
series.  First, there is the problem of emerging and expiring goods.  Then, the composition within categories 
of goods changes through time.  Even if it did not, the quality of goods changes through time.  Finally, 
trade unit values need not reflect product prices at the margin. 
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where the weight is given in the interior parentheses.  Since trade data offers only values, 
Vt
i, and volumes, Xt
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 . 
This is our operative relationship for the export price index and the approach taken to the 
import price index is the same. 
  As indicated earlier, we use annual data from 1986 through 2004.  We go down to 
four digits of the Standard International Trade Classification, which yields about 400 
types of goods.  The emerging and expiring goods problem, combined with the loss of 
those categories that specify the value of trade but no volume, reduces the coverage of the 
index to about half the total value of imports and exports.  The resulting price indices are 
converted to domestic currency at the prevailing nominal exchange rate for each year.  In 
years where China maintained two segmented foreign exchange markets (the internal 
settlement and the swap markets) an exchange market value-weighted average of the two 
rates is used. 
The problem of emerging and expiring goods is quite significant in the results.  
The proportion of product categories that are present throughout the interval covers 
between a quarter and a half of the total value of exports and imports. These relatively 
low proportions notwithstanding, we have chosen to include only those product 
categories that have content throughout the series since allowing the content of the index 
to vary would exacerbate errors due to aggregation bias and product quality escalation. 
  Data for China’s annual nominal exchange rates and the GDP deflators of its main 
trading partners are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  Current value and 
  10real GDP are drawn from China’s Statistical Yearbook.  The volume, D, and price, p
D, of 
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X













where SX is the export share of GDP. 
  The time path of the US$/Yuan exchange rate is plotted in Figure 1 and the 
corresponding domestic currency prices of exports, p
X, and imports, p
M, and the non-
traded good, p
D, are plotted in Figure 2.  These prices are listed, along with our 
constructed index for the domestic price of home goods in China, p
D, in Table 1.
13
 
4. Estimating the Parameters: 
Estimates are required of the elasticity of transformation in supply, Ω, the 
elasticity of substitution in demand, σ, and the structural parameters representing shifts in 
consumer tastes on the demand side and factor endowments and technology on the supply 
side.  For the short adjustment intervals of interest here, Devarajan et al. (1998) suggest 
that the transformation elasticity is less than unity for most developing countries and 
smallest for low-income primary-exporting economies.  One approach to estimating them 
is to use values that represent the weighted averages of sector-specific elasticities, which 
might stem from detailed econometric studies at the sectoral level (Devarajan et al. 1993).  
In the absence of an appropriate database for such elasticities we estimate each directly 
from time series. 
From (2) and (3), we have that 





ασ =+  . 
To determine the appropriate treatment of the first term on the right hand side, the logs of 
M/D and p
D/p
M are first tested for stationarity.  The hypothesis that there is a unit root is 
accepted for M/D and rejected for p
D/p
M .  The two series are therefore not cointegrated 
                                                 
13 We thank Gonca Okur for supplying an alternative set of export and import price index estimates, 
constructed by the Development Data Group at the World Bank, for the latter part of the period covered.  
While not identical with our series, these differed only slightly and so we have persisted with our own. 
  11and the first term on the right hands side of (20) is considered to carry the non-linear time 
trend indicated in (3).
14  Indeed, it is found to fit best when this trend has an 
autoregressive component, possibly reflecting lags in adjustment to relative price 
changes.
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                           (-2.04)    (2.10)         (1.78)              (0.223) 
             Adjusted R
2 =0.94,  F=83.1,  SSE=0.195. 
The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  The substitution relationship is not strong 
after de-trending, which is not surprising since it represents only short run (one year) 
responses to relative price changes.  The elasticity of substitution is nonetheless of the 
correct sign and of credible magnitude given the work of Devarajan et al. (1998). 
Turning to the production side, from equations (6) and (7), we have that: 





β =+ . 
As before, to determine the appropriate treatment of the first term on the right hand side, 
the logs of X/D and p
X/p
D are first tested for stationarity.  The hypothesis that there is a 
unit root is accepted for both series, though exports rise relative to non-traded production 
while export prices fall relative to non-traded prices.  A Johansen test then rejects 
cointegration.
16  The first term on the right hand side of (20) is therefore considered to 
carry the non-linear time trend indicated in (7).
17  The regression (ordinary least squares) 
on annual data over the period 1987 to 2004 yields: 








=− + +  
                         (-28.4)    (8.53)        (1.56) 
                                                 
14 An Augmented Dicky-Fuller test is used, yielding test statistics of -1.2 for ln(M/D) and of -4.2 for 
ln(pD/pM).  The former result strongly supports the existence of a unit root.  Although the latter result does 
not permit rejection of the null hypothesis that there is a unit root at the 1% level, the contrast with ln(M/D) 
is such as to raise doubts.  A Johansen test was therefore performed to check for cointegration of these two 
variables.  Cointegration is rejected at the 5% level. 
15 To achieve the best fit we also dropped the linear term in the quantity shifter (3), a1. 
16 The augmented Dicky-Fuller test yields a test statistic of –1.51 (significant) for ln(X/D) and of -1.94 for 
ln(pX/pD).  Both suggest the presence of unit roots, but, because the trends are in opposing directions, the 
Johansen test rejectes cointegration. 
  12                  Adjusted R
2 =0.96,  F=190.4,  SSE=0.198. 
The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics.  The positive factor endowment and 
technology shifters result from the accelerated expansion in exports relative to non-traded 
production.  Superficially at least, this suggests comparative increases in the capital stock 
and the skilled labour supply, along with advances in technology in the exportable goods 
sectors.
18
Both the elasticity of substitution on the demand side, σ, and the elasticity of 
transformation on the supply side, Ω, necessarily characterise short run (one year) 
adjustments, so large values are unexpected.  Moreover, the results, σ=0.141 and 
Ω=0.847, accord with estimates for other developing countries by Devarajan et al.  From 
(13) it is clear that these, collectively, imply that the elasticity of the home non-traded 
good price, p
D, to the ratio of import cost to export revenue, λ, is 1.012.  This provides the 
direct link between other flows on the balance of payments and the real exchange rate. 
 
5.  Reserve Accumulation and the Trade Balance 
China’s current account switched from deficit to surplus by the end of the 1980s 
and it was only once again in deficit, in 1993, the magnitude of the surplus rising steadily 
thereafter.  Prior to 1993 deficits and surpluses never exceeded two per cent of China’s 
GDP.  Yet the surpluses rose to about four per cent by the late 90s and did so again after 
the financial crisis, reaching that benchmark again in 2004.  A clearer picture of changes 
in the balance of payments can be gained if it is expressed in terms of the trade balance: 
(22)  ()
XM
NF p Xp M RNS −= ∆ − +  . 
From this it is clear that the maintenance of a balance of trade requires that net private 
inflows be precisely offset by reserve accumulation.  It is common for capital scarce 
developing countries to run deficits, financed by inflows of factor income and foreign 
direct investment.
19  From Figure 3 it is clear that this has not been China’s practice since 
1994.  Indeed, its accumulation of reserves has more than offset net private inflows, 
                                                                                                                                                   
17 To achieve the best fit we also dropped the linear term in the quantity shifter (7), b1. 
18 Of course, the growth in X/D may also be an indication of the incomplete measurement of non-traded 
goods and services in GDP. 
19 See IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005, Table 28. 
  13allowing a substantial trade surplus.
20  This surplus forms an intertemporal lense in the 
figure which is at its widest in the crisis years of 1997 and 1998.  Since then, the growth 
of both export revenue and private capital inflows has accelerated and, while reserve 
accumulation has generally kept up, the trade surplus has narrowed. 
The corresponding values of the trade balance ratio, λ (the ratio of import cost to 
export revenue), are shown in Figure 4, along with values for Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand, countries that were adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis.  It is clear 
that the decline for China began with exchange integration in 1994 and that the regional 
neighbours were forced to follow suit from the time of the financial crisis. 
The rapid expansion in China’s official foreign reserves saw more than three per 
cent of measured GDP salted away each year into foreign assets between 1994 and 1997 
and, as Figure 3 shows, the scale of this accumulation has increased further in recent 
years with the change in reserves rising from four per cent of GDP in 2001 to more than 
12 per cent of GDP in 2004.  The association between λ and this pattern of foreign 
reserve accumulation is is shown in Figure 5.  While the correspondence is evident, 1994 
and 1998 are outliers, the latter reflecting the virtual cessation of reserve accumulation in 
during the financial crisis.  During 1998 there were significant (mostly illegal) private 
outflows, rendering reserve accumulation unneccesary.  These stemmed, first, from a rise 
in domestic savings due to domestic reforms and second, to a risk premium increase 
associated with the Asian financial crisis (Fernald and Babson 2000, Tyers and Yang 
2000).  A trend separation appears after 2000.  In this period reserves continued to 
expand but imports did also, suggesting growth in private inflows in the capital account ( 
mainly foreign direct investment) and in the net income component of the current account 
in the form of interest earnings from China’s now vast foreign reserves. 
The patterns of changes in both λ and the rate of reserve accumulation followed 
corresponding changes in export revenue, particularly after 1993.  To see this we have 
fitted an exponential time trend to China’s exports and plotted the residuals along with 
the change in reserves as proportions of export earnings (Figure 6).
21  Except for the 
                                                 
20 This is in spite of unprecedented private inflow during these years in the form of foreign direct 
investment (Shengman, 1999). 
21 The fitted curve for nominal export earnings is ln[pXX] = 3.31 + 0.161 t + ε , implying an average 
growth rate of 16 per cent per year. 
  14years 1991 through 1994, the correspondence is clearly evident.  After the exchange rate 
was unified, a growing proportion of export earnings were retained as foreign reserves.  
As the figure shows, the share of export earnings salted away was thereafter always larger 
than the over-trend proportion to an extent that expanded following the financial crisis.  
By the time of the crisis China’s official foreign reserves amounted to an already 
extraordinary 15 per cent of GDP and by 2004 this proportion had grown to 37 per cent.
22
Holding back this proportion of export earnings surely kept China’s real exchange 
rate lower (and hence more competitive for exporters) than it would otherwise have been.  
By itself, this observation tends to support the mercantilist hypothesis for China’s reserve 
policy, though a concern to insure against then unforeseen events like the eventual 
financial crisis,
23 would also have been a motivating factor.  It is interesting, therefore, 
that reserve accumulation resumed and strengthened after the crisis.
24  The most 
important reason for the reserve accumulation may therefore be the immaturity of 
China’s financial system and the perceived need to retain capital controls and stable 
nominal parity against the US$.  In this macroeconomic environment, rapidly expanding 
foreign currency earnings from exports and foreign direct investment would otherwise 
appreciate the real exchange rate and this would necessitate high domestic inflation.
25
In the long run, a “sustainable” trade account for China must surely exist within 
the range (0.9<λ<1.1).  As noted earlier, one would expect to see developing countries, 
which have comparatively low levels of capital per worker and hence must finance a 
greater proportion of the investment required for growth from abroad, to occur more 
frequently in the trade deficit category.  Indeed, at China’s comparatively high rates of 
economic growth, substantial foreign commitments can be accumulated without any 
increase in its net foreign debt to GDP ratio.  We would therefore expect the sustainable 
range to have λ>1. 
                                                 
22 For comparisons, see IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2000, Table 36. 
23 See Dooley et al. (2004). 
24 Prasad and Wei (2005) do not support the mercantilist hypothesis for this behaviour, though they do not 
offer a clear alternative, choosing to focus instead on extraordinarily high proportion of FDI in China’s 
foreign investment. 
25 Recall that the real exchange rate is the common currency price of home goods relative to foreign goods.  
It can be expressed via equation (14) as eR=E P
Y/P*, where E is the nominal rate, P
Y is the home GDP price 
and P* is the corresponding foreign price level.  Any appreciation of the real exchange rate therefore 
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6. The Real Effective Exchange Rate 
  Before calculating China’s real effective exchange rate, it is useful to perform a 
validation test of the aggregated general equilibrium model.  We do this by constructing a 
simulated series for pD, using equation (13), from our observed values for pM, pX , λ and 
the shifters α and β.  In Figure 7 this artificial series is displayed and compared with its 
observed counterpart (which is derived from China’s GDP deflator using equation (19).  
The simulated version misses a number of turning points, particularly in the three years 
from 1994.  This is because of the effects of the substantial devaluation in 1994 (Figure 
1).  The annual data we use for China’s RMB denominated import and export prices 
appear, however, to spread the effects of this devaluation over the two years 1994 and 
1995 (Figure 2).  This inconsistency could be due to differing definitions of the calendar 
year (values could be chosen as end year values, mid-year values or annual averages, for 
example) or to invoicing lags.  Either way, in the absence of better data, we have retained 
the anomalies rather than make ad hoc adjustments.  Of course, construction from 
equation (13) is subject to error whenever the annual proportional changes are large.  
These errors and potential errors notwithstanding the model captures the trend of the 
recorded series of pD quite well. 
  The rising trend in the price of the domestic good in the 1990s stems from 
substantial increases in 1993, 1994 and 1996, prior to the financial crisis.  The rising 
trend is then resumed after 2001.  By separating the components of equation (13) we can 
apportion annual changes amongst the four contributing effects: border price levels, the 
terms of trade, the trade balance and the quantity shifters reflecting factor accumulation 
and changes in tastes and technology.  The results are given in Table 2.  The major surge 
in 1993 is seen to stem primarily from the trade balance.  This was a year in which 
reserves changed little and exports were below trend but in which imports and domestic 
inflation surged.  The following year, however, the exchange rate was unified, export 
earnings returned to trend and an unprecedented sum was set aside as reserves (Figure 3), 
yet in that year too the trade balance effect dominates..  In 1995, however, this effect was 
                                                                                                                                                   
requires either a nominal appreciation or a domestic inflation.  See Tyers (2001) and Roberts and Tyers 
(2003). 
  16more than offset by a rise in border prices, due to the apparently lagged effect of the 1994 
devaluation (Figures 2 and 3).  Although it has not always been the dominant force, the 
trade balance effect corresponds closely with the simulated price changes of the domestic 
good.  This is shown in Figure 8, which compares the annual proportional changes in p
D 
with those in λ.  Given the correspondence between the trade balance and the 
accumulation of official foreign reserves indicated in Figures 5 and 6, the management of 
the latter clearly had an important influence over the home price level. 
The next step is to calculate the real effective exchange rate from equation (15).  
We do this first from the raw data, including an estimate of the Chinese GDP deflator 
derived from recorded nominal and real GDP levels.
26  We then use the model to derive 
the artificial series for p
D in Figure 7 and, from it, construct a correspondingly artificial 
series for the GDP deflator, p
Y.  This, in turn, is used in equation (15) to derive a 
simulated real effective exchange rate based on observed trade balance statistics.  The 
two series are compared in Figure 9  and listed in Table 3.  Once again, apart from the 
turning point errors following the depreciation of 1994, the tracking is fair throughout the 
period. 
The final step is to use the model to simulate the real effective exchange rate at 
the bounds of the “sustainable” trade balance range.  To do this we set an artificial path 
for λ by beginning with the observed value for 1987 and stepping in five per cent 
increments to the target values: λ=(0.9, 1.1).  Equation (13) is then used to calculate an 
artificial series for p
D.  Time-varying but exogenous export shares of GDP are then used 
to construct a corresponding series for the GDP deflator, p
Y.  This is used in equation (15) 
to prepare our simulated series for the real effective exchange rate.  The resulting series 
are set out in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 10. 
  The path of China’s real effective exchange rate skirts the lower bound of the 
range (λ=0.9) throughout the period.  During 1996-2000 the real exchange rate is 
unambiguously undervalued.  As shown in Figure 2, during these years a combination of 
balance of payments and terms of trade shocks saw China’s p
D stabilise.  Yet prices 
                                                 
26 For the effective rate, the weighted average is here taken over the bilateral trade values and price indices 
of mainland China’s largest trading partners: Japan, the US, Korea, the European Union, Canada, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand.  Sources are the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and, for Taiwan, the 
Monthly Price Bulleting of Gaohsiong. 
  17abroad were falling in Chinese currency terms (the nominal exchange rate with the US 
dollar was very stable after 1994, as indicated in Figure 1 and the US$ was appreciating 
against other currencies).  The key reason for the undervaluation in this period was the 
very substantial contributions made to official foreign reserves in 1994-1997. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the recorded real appreciation between 1995 
and 1998 was 22 per cent.  Balanced trade in that period would have delivered a real 
appreciation over 1995 of 43 per cent, 19 percentage points larger than the one actually 
observed.  Had a modest trade deficit of 10 per cent of exports (roughly 1.5 per cent of 
GDP) been maintained, the real appreciation in this period would have been 54 per cent, 
larger than that observed by 32 percentage points. 
  A slower accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves after 1994 would 
have raised imports, leading to higher consumption.  The consequentially higher relative 
domestic price level might have increased domestic service employment growth but , 
with the maintenance of fixed nominal parity with the US$, it would have necessitated an 
inflation.  Moreover, in the lead-up to the Asian financial crisis, the stock of official 
foreign reserves would have been substantially smaller than the 15 per cent of China’s 
GDP held abroad in 1997.  This would have rendered China more vulnerable to a 
“country run” than it was.  Yet the crisis had been triggered, at least in part, by the 
declining export performance of the most affected countries, principally Thailand, Korea, 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  China’s share of both Asian and global exports expanded 
substantially between 1994 and 1997 at the expense of these competing exporters 
(Hussain and Radelet, 2000).  Had China been less competitive during this period, it is 
possible that the crisis might have been avoided or it might have taken a different form.  




  The trend of China’s equilibrium real effective exchange rate in the lead-up to the 
Asian financial crisis is examined and found to fall prior to 1995, to rise significantly 
through the crisis period and to remain fairly flat thereafter.  To assess whether this path 
would have differed under alternative macroeconomic policies, the Devarajan-Lewis-
  18Robinson three-good general equilibrium model is used to simulate the time path of home 
prices and the real effective exchange rate from the late 1980s through 2004.  To adapt 
the model, however, accurate series are needed for indices of export and import prices.  
Since these are not available from Chinese government statistics, estimates are derived 
from UN commodity trade statistics.  When the recorded time path of China’s trade 
balance is used in the simulations the results show a fair fit to the trend of China’s 
implied GDP deflator. 
  In part because of an unprecedented rate of accumulation of official foreign 
reserves, China’s trade balance moved well into the surplus range after the unification of 
its exchange rate in 1994 and through 1997.  The rising trend in the real effective 
exchange rate in that period notwithstanding, this caused the domestic price level, and 
hence the real effective rate, to be lower than it would otherwise have been.  Indeed, 
monetary policy concerns aside, a it might have been advantageous for a rapidly-
expanding yet capital scarce developing country like China to sustain some degree of 
trade deficit without any expansion of the net foreign debt to GDP ratio.  Were such a 
strategy to have been feasible it might have fostered even more economic growth and 
improvements in living standards than were actually achieved.  We therefore conjecture 
that China’s equilibrium real effective exchange rate was higher than that observed in the 
lead-up to the crisis.  Indeed, a simulation with a trade deficit amounting to 10 per cent of 
export earnings, or 1.5 per cent of a GDP level that was expanding at more than eight per 
cent per year, suggests undervaluation in 1998 by as much as a fifth. 
This undervaluation clearly fostered exports and foreign investment in export 
industries and the extraordinary rate of reserve accumulation that was its cause helped 
secure China against a “country run” during the financial crisis.  Yet the primary reason 
for it is unlikely to be either mercantilism or risk-spreading.  The reserve accumulation 
was clearly associated with growth in private saving relative to investment opportunities 
(the “savings glut” explanation),
27 though its origin is more likely to have been driven by 
the associated immaturity of China’s domestic financial system and the perceived 
necessity to retain capital controls and roughly fixed nominal parity of the RMB with the 
US$.  With this macroeconomic policy regime, rapidly expanding foreign currently 
                                                 
27 See Chinn and Ito (2005). 
  19inflows from export earnings and foreign investment in China are highly inflationary 
without offsetting outflows into foreign reserves.  As China’s financial sector matures it 
will accumulate reserves more slowly and allow more exchange rate flexibility.  A 
manageable level of inflation should then assist Chinese labour markets to cope with the 
continued dislocation that is the inevitable consequence of domestic economic 
restructuring. 
Finally, we draw attention to two important caveats associated with these results.  
First, the simulated counterfactual real exchange rates have a unit elasticity of sensitivity 
to the sum of the absolute values of our estimates of the elasticities of substitution in 
demand and transformation in supply.  These elasticities are notoriously difficult to 
estimate accurately.  While different estimates of these elasticities would yield differing 
degrees of undervaluation during the crisis period, we believe the conclusion that 
undervaluation widened in the crisis period is robust.  Second, our model is a 
comparative static one, subjected to a sequence of annual shocks.  It does not endogenise 
the underlying process of capital accumulation that lies behind China’s growth.  Rather, 
shifts in the production possibility frontier come from our econometric analysis and are 
therefore exogenous and the same for both our base line and counterfactual simulations.  
Whether China’s GDP growth rate would have been higher or lower with more real 
appreciations and more rapid consumption growth is not a straight-forward question and 
must be left to more complete models for analysis. 
 
References 
Chen, X.B. (1999), “An analysis of the real exchange rate of the RMB”, The Economic 
Research Journal, 1:22-28 (in Chinese). 
Cheung, Y.W., M.D. Chin and E. Fujii (2006), “Why the Renminbi might be overvalued 
(but probably isn’t)”, paper presented at the conference on the WTO, China and 
the Asian Economies IV, University of International Business and Economics, 
Beijing, June 24-25. 
Chinn, M.D. and H. Ito (2005), “Current account balances, financial development and 
institutions: assaying the world ‘savings glut’”, NBER Working Paper 11761, 
Cambridge, MA, November. 
Corden, W.M. (1993),  Exchange rate policies for developing countries, Economic 
Journal, 103: 198-207. 
Chou,W.L and Shih,Y.C. (1998), “The Equilibrium Exchange Rate of the Chinese 
Renminbi”, Journal of Comparative Economics, (26) 165-174. 
  20Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance of Taiwan. From the website: 
http://www.mof.gov.tw/statistic/trade/2281.htm. 
Devarajan, S. (1999) “Estimates of real exchange rate misalignment with a simple 
general equilibrium model”, Chapter 8 in L.E. Hinkle and P.J. Montiel (eds.) 
Exchange Rate Misalignment: Concepts and Measurement for Developing 
Countries (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank). 
Devarajan, Shantayanan; Lewis, Jeffrey D and Robinson, Sherman, (1990) “Policy 
Lessons from Trade-Focused, Two Sector Models”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 
12(4):625-657. 
________, “External Shocks, Purchasing Power Parity, and the Equilibrium Real 
Exchange Rate”, The World Bank Economic Review, The World Bank, 1993, 
Vol.7 No.1. 
Devarajan, Shantayanan, Delfin S. Go and Hong-yi Li (1998), “Import-Substitution and 
Export- Transformation Elasticities.” The World Bank, Development Research 
Group, Washington, D.C.  
Dooley, M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2004), “Direct investment, rising real 
wages and the absorption of excess labor in the periphery”, NBER Working Paper 
10626 (July), Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger (1999), “Don’t devalue the Renminbi”, The 5
th Column, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, August 26, p.30. 
Edwards, Sebastian (1989), “Real Exchange Rates in the Developing Countries:Concepts 
and Measurement”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
2950, April. 
Fernald, J.G and O.D. Babson (2000) , “Why has China survived the financial crisis so 
well: what risks remain?”, in Chen et al., Financial Market Reform in China: 
Progress, Problems and Prospects, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Hinkle, Laurence,E. and Montiel, Peter J.(1999), Exchange Rate Misalignment: Concepts 
and Measurement for Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hussain, M. and S. Radelet (2000), “Export competitiveness in Asia”, Chapter 4 in W.T. 
Woo, J.D. Sachs and K. Schwab, The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a 
Resilient Asia, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Ma,Gang (2000), “China’s real equilibrium exchange rate”(in Chinese), National 
Economic Research Institute of China Working Paper No. 2000-005 
(http://www.neri.org.cn/company/neri/lunwen7.htm). 
Ni, W. (1999) “An analysis of the effect of currency depreciation in a non-equilibrium 
environment”, Economic Research, No.4 (in Chinese). 
Prasad, E. and S. Wei (2005), “The Chinese approach to capital inflows: patterns and 
possible explanations”, NBER Working Paper No. 11306, Cambridge, MA. 
Roberts, I. and R. Tyers, “China’s exchange rate policy: the case for greater flexibility”, 
Asian Economic Journal, 17(2): 157-186, 2003. 
Rodrik, D. (2006), “What’s so special about China’s exports?”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 11947, Cambridge, MA, January. 
Shengman, Zhang (1999), “Capital flows to East Asia: China”, Chapter 3 in Feldstein, M. 
(ed.) International Capital Flows, Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the 
NBER. 
  21Tyers, R. (2001), “China after the crisis: the elemental macroeconomics”, Asian 
Economic Journal, 15(2): 173-199, August. 
Tyers, R. and Y. Yang (2000), “Weathering the crisis: the role of China”, Pacific 
Economic Papers No. 308, October. 
Wei, S. and R.J. Zeckhauser (1998), “Two crises and two Chinas”, Japan and the World 
Economy, 10: 359-369. 
Whalley, J. and X. Xin (2006), “China’s FDI and non-FDI economies and the 
sustainability of future high Chinese growth”, NBER Working Paper 12249, 
Cambridge, MA, May. 
Woo, W.T. (2000), “China: confronting restructuring and stability”, Chapter 7 in W.T. 
Woo, J.D. Sachs and K. Schwab, The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a 
Resilient Asia, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Xiao, F. and D. Kimball (2006), “Effectiveness and effects of China capital controls”, 
paper presented at the conference on the WTO, China and the Asian Economies 
IV, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, June 24-25. 
Yang, Y. and R. Tyers (2001), “The Asian crisis and economic change in China”, 
Japanese Economic Review, 52(4): 492-511, December. 
Zhang, M. and G. Shen (2000) The relationship between export expansion and the 
renminbi exchange rate mechanism: an investigation [in Chinese], in The Study of 
Finance and Economics [Caijing Yanjiu], Vol.26, No.1. 
 
  22 














  Source: Prior to 1994 two exchange rates were used (the internal settlement rate and the swap 
rate).  In these years an exchange market value-weighted average of the two rates is used.  Data are from 




Figure 2: Constructed Home Currency Price Indices of Exports, 
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Source: The trade data are from the current account of the balance of payments in the IMF: 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Figure 5: Imports and the Annual Decline in Official Foreign Reserves 












1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Imports as a % exports, lamda





Figure 6: Changes in Official Foreign Reserves and Departures from 









1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
% departure of $US export earnings from an exponential trend
Change in reserves as a % exports
 
  25 














Source: Recorded local currency price of domestic good, estimated from data for real and nominal GDP 




















         Source: Annual % changes in recorded λ from Figure 4 and simulated values of p
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Figure 10: The Recorded Real Effective Exchange Rate compared with  
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Table 1: Indices for RMB Prices of Exports, Imports and the Domestic 
Non-Traded Good 




1987  100.00 100.00 100.00 
1988  110.97 119.65 129.51 
1989  118.93 131.24 146.00 
1990  125.38 147.51 156.56 
1991  134.51 149.80 160.61 
1992  143.73 156.69 169.94 
1993  172.29 170.84 187.18 
1994  203.99 218.43 216.94 
1995  234.67 250.96 264.04 
1996  250.34 264.05 244.86 
1997  252.87 264.54 247.23 
1998  250.40 247.08 238.57 
1999  247.60 228.55 226.41 
2000  249.62 221.46 239.54 
2001  260.19 216.37 234.03 
2002  267.84 204.04 221.86 
2003  277.13 213.62 243.38 
2004  302.15 224.04 260.52 
    Source: Calculations described in the text. 
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Table 2: Contributions to Annual Changes in the Simulated p
D












1989  20 21 -10 8  1 
1990  16 10 -3  0  9 
1991  -3 12 5 -28 8 
1992  7 2 -1 4 3 
1993  7 5 -1 9 -6 
1994  31 9 -1 24 -1 
1995  19 26 12 -19 0 
1996  -9 16 -7 -8 -10 
1997  33 3 13 1 15 
1998  -16 0  -1 -14 -1 
1999  1 -6 -3 0 10 
2000  11 -7 -2  9 11 
2001  -3 -2 -9 6  2 
2002  -2 -2 0  1 -1 
2003  3 -6 -1 -1  10 
2004  5 5 -5 4 1 





Table 3: Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices 
Simulated based on the following trade balance 
assumptions: 




Y Recorded λ  λ=0.9  λ=1.0  λ=1.1 
1987  100  100 100 100 100 
1988  93  99 90 90 97 
1989 95  109  95  99  107 
1990 88  94  98  106  114 
1991  79  85 86 93  100 
1992  71  76 71 77 83 
1993  66  76 60 65 70 
1994  70  81 74 79 85 
1995  79  75 73 78 84 
1996 87  99  95  102  110 
1997 92  91  99  106  114 
1998  96  96  105 113 122 
1999  92  100 102 110 118 
2000 93  99  96  103  111 
2001 101  102  98  105  113 
2002 101  102  98  106  113 
2003 97  100  94  100  107 
2004 98  101  92  98  104 
Source: Calculations based on the analysis described in the text. 
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